CA1-10 (Politicization of GAAP) SOLUTION

CA1-10 
(Politicization of GAAP) Some accountants have said that politicization in the development and acceptance of generally accepted accounting principles (i.e., rule-making) is taking place. Some use the term “politicization” in a narrow sense to mean the influence by governmental agencies, particularly the Securities and Exchange Commission, on the development of generally accepted accounting principles. Others use it more broadly to mean the compromise that results when the bodies responsible for developing generally accepted accounting principles are pressured by interest groups (SEC, American Accounting Association, businesses through their various organizations, Institute of Management Accountants, financial analysts, bankers, lawyers, and so on).
Instructions
(a) The Committee on Accounting Procedure of the AICPA was established in the mid- to late 1930s
and functioned until 1959, at which time the Accounting Principles Board came into existence. In
1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board was formed and the APB went out of existence.
Do the reasons these groups were formed, their methods of operation while in existence, and the
reasons for the demise of the first two indicate an increasing politicization (as the term is used in
the broad sense) of accounting standard-setting? Explain your answer by indicating how the CAP,
the APB, and the FASB operated or operate. Cite specific developments that tend to support your
answer.
(b) What arguments can be raised to support the “politicization” of accounting rule-making?
(c) What arguments can be raised against the “politicization” of accounting rule-making?

Solution

a) CAP. The Committee on Accounting Procedure, CAP, which was in existence from 1939 to 1959, was a natural outgrowth of AICPA committees which were in existence during the period 1933 to 1938. The committee was formed in direct response to the criticism received by the accounting profession during the financial crisis of 1929 and the years thereafter. The authorization to issue pronouncements on matters of accounting principles and procedures was based on the belief that the AICPA had the responsibility to establish practices that would become generally accepted by the profession and by corporate management.

As a general rule, the CAP directed its attention, almost entirely, to resolving specific accounting problems and topics rather than to the development of generally accepted accounting principles. The committee voted on the acceptance of specific Accounting Research Bulletins published by the committee. A two-thirds majority was required to issue a particular research bulletin. The CAP did not have the authority to require acceptance of the issued bulletins by the general membership
of the AICPA, but rather received its authority only upon general acceptance of the pronouncement by the members. That is, the bulletins set forth normative accounting procedures that “should be” followed by the accounting profession, but were not “required” to be followed.

It was not until well after the demise of the CAP, in 1964, that the Council of the AICPA adopted recommendations that departures from effective CAP Bulletins should be disclosed in financial statements or in audit reports of members of the AICPA. The demise of the CAP could probably be traced to four distinct factors: (1) the narrow nature of the subjects covered by the bulletins issued by the CAP, (2) the lack of any theoretical groundwork in establishing the procedures presented in the bulletins, (3) the lack of any real authority by the CAP in prescribing adherence to the procedures described by the bulletins, and (4) the lack of any formal representation on the CAP of interest groups such as corporate managers, governmental agencies, and security analysts.

APB. The objectives of the APB were formulated mainly to correct the deficiencies of the CAP as described above. The APB was thus charged with the responsibility of developing written expression of generally accepted accounting principles through consideration of the research done by other members of the AICPA in preparing Accounting Research Studies. The committee was in turn given substantial authoritative standing in that all opinions of the APB were to constitute substantial authoritative support for generally accepted accounting principles. If an individual member of the AICPA decided that a principle or procedure outside of the official pronouncements of the APB had substantial authoritative support, the member had to disclose the departure from the official APB opinion in the financial statements of the firm in question.

The membership of the committee comprising the APB was also extended to include representation from industry, government, and academe. The opinions were also designed to include minority dissents by members of the board. Exposure drafts of the proposed opinions were readily distributed.

The demise of the APB occurred primarily because the purposes for which it was created were not being accomplished. Broad generally accepted accounting principles were not being developed. The research studies supposedly being undertaken in support of subsequent opinions to be expressed by the APB were often ignored. The committee in essence became a simple extension of the original CAP in that only very specific problem areas were being addressed. Interest groups outside of the accounting profession questioned the appropriateness and desirability of having the AICPA directly responsible for the establishment of GAAP. Politicization of the establishment of GAAP had become a reality because of the far-reaching effects involved in the questions being resolved.

FASB. The formal organization of the FASB represents an attempt to vest the responsibility of establishing GAAP in an organization representing the diverse interest groups affected by the use of GAAP. The FASB is independent of the AICPA. It is independent, in fact, of any private or govern-mental organization. Individual CPAs, firms of CPAs, accounting educators, and representatives of private industry will now have an opportunity to make known their views to the FASB through their membership on the Board. Independence is facilitated through the funding of the organization and payment of the members of the Board. Full-time members are paid by the organization and the organization itself is funded solely through contributions. Thus, no one interest group has a vested interest in the FASB.

Conclusion. The evolution of the current FASB certainly does represent “increasing politicization of accounting standards setting.” Many of the efforts extended by the AICPA can be directly attributed to the desire to satisfy the interests of many groups within our society. The FASB represents, perhaps, just another step in this evolutionary process.

b) Arguments for politicization of the accounting rule-making process:

1. Accounting depends in large part on public confidence for its success. Consequently, the critical issues are not solely technical, so all those having a bona fide interest in the output of accounting should have some influence on that output.

2. There are numerous conflicts between the various interest groups. In the face of this, compromise is necessary, particularly since the critical issues in accounting are value judgments, not the type which are solvable, as we have traditionally assumed, using deterministic models. Only in this way (reasonable compromise) will the financial community have confidence in the fairness and objectivity of accounting rule-making.

3. Over the years, accountants have been unable to establish, on the basis of technical accounting elements, rules which would bring about the desired uniformity and acceptability. This inability itself indicates rule-setting is primarily consensual in nature.

4. The public accounting profession, through bodies such as the Accounting Principles Board, made rules which business enterprises and individuals “had” to follow. For many years, these businesses and individuals had little say as to what the rules would be, in spite of the fact that their economic well-being was influenced to a substantial degree by those rules. It is only natural that they would try to influence or control the factors that determine their economic well-being.

c) Arguments against the politicization of the accounting rule-making process:

1. Many accountants feel that accounting is primarily technical in nature. Consequently, they feel that substantive, basic research by objective, independent and fair-minded researchers ultimately will result in the best solutions to critical issues, such as the concepts of income and capital, even if it is accepted that there isn’t necessarily a single “right” solution.

2. Even if it is accepted that there are no “absolute truths” as far as critical issues are concerned, many feel that professional accountants, taking into account the diverse interests of the various groups using accounting information, are in the best position, because of their independence, education, training, and objectivity, to decide what generally accepted accounting principles ought to be.

3. The complex situations that arise in the business world require that trained accountants develop the appropriate accounting principles.

4. The use of consensus to develop accounting principles would decrease the professional status of the accountant.

5. This approach would lead to “lobbying” by various parties to influence the establishment of accounting principles.